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1. Introduction
In this paper, I draw parallels between the literatures on the effects of law on the
financial development of countries and on the effects of accounting standards on financial
reporting outcomes. My central thesis is that these literatures are complementary in
terms of what they have to say about understanding the effects of law, regulations and
accounting standards on economic and financial reporting outcomes. Moreover, both
literatures suggest that U.S. securities laws and financial reporting standards have taken a
more regulatory direction over time. I then take these themes and draw implications for
the effects of the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around
the world at the time of adoption and over time.
The adoption of IFRS around the world is occurring rapidly under the assumption
that there will be benefits from having a uniform set of standards for financial reporting
around the world so that cross-country comparisons of firms will be easier and more
transparent. However, that goal will not be fully realized unless the underlying
institutional and economic factors evolve to become more similar as well, which seems
unlikely (or at least more costly and time-consuming than changing accounting
standards). Moreover, if the underlying institutional and economic factors do not become
similar across countries over time, then the goal of similar financial reporting outcomes is
not likely be a desirable economic outcome.
Research in the accounting literature convincingly concludes that accounting
standards alone do not determine financial reporting outcomes (see for example, Ball,
Robin and Wu (2003), Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) or the survey by Leuz and
Wysocki (2008)). By financial reporting outcomes, I mean the quality of financial
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reporting, measured in a variety of ways that we observe in different countries. Many
forces shape the quality of financial reporting, and accounting standards should be
viewed as but one of those forces. Indeed, the international accounting literature suggests
that the effect of accounting standards alone may be weak relative to the effects of forces
such as managers’ incentives, auditor quality and incentives, regulation, enforcement,
ownership structure and other institutional features of the economy in determining the
outcome of the financial reporting process.
Mahoney (2008) suggests that small nuances in how securities laws are used and
enforced can lead to large differences in observed outcomes. Coffee (2007) argues that
differences in enforcement intensity may help explain how large differences in economic
outcomes arise from seemingly minor differences in formal legal rules. Mahoney
concludes that legal indices like those used in papers such as La Porta et al. (1997) miss
large differences in legal institutions because coding substantive and procedural rules
fails to capture how the law is actually used. Coffee (2007) concludes that understanding
not the enforcement rules, but how enforcement is carried out as measured both by inputs
and outputs, is much more important for understanding differences in economic outcomes
than the enforcement rules “on the books”. In light of those issues, some authors (e.g.,
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008)) have begun to use surveybased measures by asking local attorneys how a particular transaction or situation would
be handled in a particular country.
Mahoney (2008) goes on to argue that U.S. securities laws have evolved over
time from a system aimed at facilitating contracting among parties to one that is more
regulatory in nature and less useful for facilitating contracting because of changes made
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by Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Ball (2008) makes a
related point about financial accounting standards, arguing that regulation encourages a
“rules-based” approach to financial reporting over a “principles-based” approach, where
the latter emphasizes the notion that the accounting disclosures fairly represent the
company’s financial position as opposed to the former, which emphasizes compliance
over substance.
All of these issues have implications for the financial reporting effects of IFRS
around the world at the time of adoption and over time. In particular, the impact of a
common set of accounting standards across countries is unlikely to lead to similar
financial reporting outcomes across countries unless the other forces that govern the
quality of financial statements become more similar across countries as well. Indeed, it is
not at all obvious that similar financial reporting outcomes would lead to greater
economic efficiency given cross-country differences in the other institutional features of
the economies. Further, even if common accounting standards are adopted, it is likely
that regulatory forces will force differences in IFRS across countries over time unless the
underlying institutional features of the economies become similar over time.
In Section 2, I discuss the evidence of the effect of financial reporting standards
on financial reporting outcomes. In Section 3, I discuss the economic consequences of
how the law and regulation are actually used, drawing heavily on Mahoney (2008). I
then go on to discuss the likely importance of enforcement on financial reporting
outcomes in Section 4. Finally, I make some concluding remarks in Section 5.
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2. The Effect of Financial Reporting Standards on Financial Reporting Outcomes
Evidence from the international accounting literature concludes that accounting
standards alone do not determine the quality of the financial reporting outcomes. This is
not to say that standards don’t matter at all, but rather that there are many forces that
shape the quality of financial reporting and accounting standards should be viewed as but
one of these. These forces include managers’ incentives, auditor quality and incentives,
regulation, enforcement, ownership structure and other institutional features of the
economy.
Several papers provide empirical evidence on the effect of accounting standards
on financial reporting outcomes. For example, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003), henceforth
BRW, show that financial reporting quality was low in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore
and Thailand despite presumably high quality reporting standards because the
institutional structure provided incentives to issue low-quality reports. BRW argue that
countries that want to increase financial reporting quality have to think about changes in
manager and auditor incentives and other institutional features and that those may be
more important than mandating higher quality reporting standards. They also argue that
the pressure to reduce variation in accounting standards across countries will not resolve
differences in the quality of financial reporting.1
Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) examine the extent of earnings management
across three different types of economies: (1) outsider economies with large stock
markets, dispersed ownership, strong investor rights and strong legal enforcement
(Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, UK, Norway, Canada, Australia and USA); (2)

1

See Holthausen (2003) for a discussion of Ball, Robin and Wu (2003).
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insider economies with less well-developed stock markets, concentrated ownership, weak
investor rights, but strong legal enforcement (Austria, Taiwan, Germany, Switzerland,
France and Sweden); and (3) economies that are similar to the insider economy described
above but with weak legal enforcement (Thailand, Greece, Korea, Spain and India).
They find increasing earnings management as they move from economies (1) to (3)
indicating that institutional forces such as the extent of investor protection substantially
shape financial reporting outcomes. Further, they find more earnings management in
Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia than any other country in the first cluster, consistent
with BRW.
Lang, Ready and Wilson (2006) compare the properties of U.S. GAAP accounting
numbers for U.S. firms and for foreign firms that cross-list in the U.S. and show that the
quality of the U.S. GAAP earnings numbers is higher for the U.S. firms than the crosslisted firms, but also that the cross-listed firms have higher earnings quality than the noncross-listed firms from the same country. They also provide evidence that suggests that
earnings quality for firms cross listed in the U.S. is lower for firms that come from
countries with weaker local investor protection and they speculate that the lower standard
of U.S. public and private enforcement on foreign cross-listed firms relative to U.S. firms
(see Siegel (2005) and Frost and Pownall (1994)) is part of the reason for the observed
differences.
Leuz (2006) argues that the degree of concentration in ownership structures affects
manager’s incentives to manage earnings and provides evidence that more concentrated
ownership structures result in greater earnings management. Leuz argues that even if
enforcement were held constant, ownership structure, home-country market forces and
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varying incentives for earnings management would lead to differences in the quality of
financial reports. Thus, as long as there is discretion in financial reporting (and it is hard
to believe that discretion could or should ever be eliminated), even strict enforcement will
not successfully eliminate all of the variation in reporting quality.
Other studies, such as Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Burgstahler, Hail and
Leuz (2006), among others, support the view that changes in standards alone will not
lead to substantially similar financial reporting outcomes and that again the standards
may be less important than the other institutional features of the reporting and legal
environment.
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2007) provide evidence that the effects of voluntary
adoption of IFRS on market liquidity and the cost of capital depend on whether the
voluntary adopters make a serious commitment to transparency; they find that only those
making a commitment to transparency experience significant capital market effects.
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) find that the capital market benefits associated with
mandatory adoption of IFRS occur only in countries where firms have incentives to be
transparent and where legal enforcement is strong. Thus both of these papers suggest that
the mere adoption of IFRS does not lead to similar financial reporting outcomes, at least
not initially.
The conclusions of these studies are hardly unexpected. Market and incentive
forces are indeed powerful and hence it is not surprising that financial reporting outcomes
will be strongly influenced by incentives of managers and auditors, the nature of the
ownership structure of corporations, other market and political forces in the home

7

country and the degree of enforcement in the home country, even if accounting standards
are held constant.
3. The Economic Consequences of the Use of Law
Mahoney (2008) briefly traces the development of securities laws in the United
States. He argues that U.S. Securities Laws started out to facilitate contracting between
managers, owners and other financial intermediaries and that slowly over time the SEC
and Congress have added a large number of regulatory features. For example, he points
to the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Securities Exchange Act of 1964, the
Williams Act of 1968, rules adopted on the routing of trades to various markets in the
1990s and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as movements to a more regulatory
environment for securities. Mahoney poses the question of whether the recent decline in
the United States’ share of global capital raising is due to its more regulatory regime,
including the recent passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.
Mahoney (2008) also argues that how law is used, not the laws per se, can have
fundamental economic consequences as various agents figure out how to exploit the law
to their own advantage. He discusses two unintended uses of law that led to substantially
different enforcement mechanisms; one private and the other public. The first is an
example of an apparently small rule change with large economic consequences; the
second is an example of innovation in the use of existing laws.
Mahoney’s first example is a 1966 amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 (the class-action rule). Prior to 1966, Rule 23 did not bind any members of a class to a
lawsuit unless they had formally opted to join the suit. The amendment to Rule 23
changed the default position such that potential members of a class were included unless
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they chose to opt out of the class. This change essentially made it possible for plaintiff’s
attorneys to provide the defendants with a mechanism for determining their exposure by
settling with the entire class which was generally not feasible before because individual
attorneys did not represent most of the class. Mahoney provides evidence that the
number of class-action suits increased subsequent to this rule change and those firms with
greater capitalization and higher share turnover experienced more negative returns in the
period in which class-action suits began to emerge in record numbers. Subsequent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
reversed this trend and led to a decline in the extent of class-action suits.
Mahoney’s second example is the use of the Martin Act by Eliot Spitzer, then
New York State Attorney General, to bring criminal actions against individual securities
analysts and their firms for conflicts of interest that he alleged violated the Martin Act.
There was no change in the law that triggered its use; rather it was just the recognition
that an existing law could be used to bring criminal actions against individuals and
corporations. Mahoney concludes that “through these prosecutions, Spitzer became a de
facto regulator of the U.S. securities markets alongside, the SEC.”

Another example,

the 2003 Justice Department “Thompson Memorandum”, allowed Federal prosecutors to
demand that firms that were under the threat of indictment would agree to not pay legal
expenses for individual officers and employees. This innovative use of existing rules
allowed federal prosecutors to put pressure on companies to take actions those companies
would not have otherwise taken in order to avoid indictment. This continued until the
Thompson Memorandum was rescinded by the Justice Department in 2006.
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Mahoney argues that prosecution risk increased so much in the early 2000’s that it
may also help explain the sharp decline in the listing of foreign firms in the U.S. As
corroborating evidence he points to the evidence in Duarte, Kong, Siegel and Young
(2007) which suggests that foreign companies are less likely to cross-list in the U.S. after
2002 if an extradition treaty exists between the U.S. and the home country of the foreign
company. Of course, there are alternative explanations for the decline in U.S. listings.
One such explanation is the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (Piotroski and Srinivasan
(2008)). Another explanation is that the advantage of listing in the U.S. relative to say
London’s Main Market has not changed, but the characteristics of firms listing has
changed which means that they aren’t listing as often in the U.S. (Doidge, Karolyi and
Stulz (2008). A third alternative explanation is that an improvement in the desirability of
competitor markets (mainly in Europe) coupled with increased regulatory costs in the
U.S. post 2002 have led to the decline in new listings in the U.S. (Zingales (2007)).
How does all of this relate to the literature on accounting standards? The
literature on accounting standards indicates that it is not just the standards per se that
matter for financial reporting outcomes; it is incentives and other institutional factors as
well. Mahoney makes a similar point here with respect to the law. Individuals who use
the law have an incentive to use it for their own benefit and are continually looking for
new ways to use existing law to their own advantage. Thus, incentives will shape the
economic consequences of the law, similar to how incentives and other attributes affect
financial reporting outcomes as documented in the international accounting literature.2

2

I should note that laws and accounting standards if enforced adequately also have the potential to affect
individual’s incentives. Thus, there need not be a one-way effect from incentives to accounting standards
and laws.
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4. The Economic Consequences of Enforcement
In the international accounting literature that looks at the effect of accounting
standards on financial reporting outcomes, we don’t yet have very specific evidence of
the main factors that shape financial reporting outcomes. As I mentioned previously,
Lang, Ready and Wilson (2006) provide evidence that the reporting quality for U.S. firms
is higher than the reporting quality of foreign firms cross-listed in the United States and
Leuz (2006) provides at least preliminary evidence that ownership concentration is
important in determining financial reporting outcomes when comparing the financial
reporting quality of U.S. firms to foreign firms cross-listed in the United States. Further,
as I also indicated Frost and Pownall (1994) and Siegel (2005) suggest that both public
and private enforcement of foreign firms cross-listed in the U.S. is weaker than it is for
U.S. firms.
If, as argued above, enforcement is weaker for foreign firms cross-listed in the
U.S. than for U.S. firms, it is not surprising that the financial reporting outcomes are not
the same because cross-listed firms are still subject to home-country institutions and
market forces. The weaker enforcement of firms cross-listed in the U.S. allows the other
factors that affect financial reporting quality, such as concentration of ownership, to
operate with more force as managers of the cross-listed firms do not face the same costs
as their U.S. counterparts in responding to various incentives that make them want to
shape their financial reports in certain ways.
Yet the fact that cross-listed firms engage in less earnings management than noncross-listed firms from the same countries (Lang, Ready and Wilson (2006), Leuz (2006))
suggests that U.S. enforcement of cross-listed firms matters even if that enforcement is
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weaker for cross-listed firms than for U.S. firms. Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) and
Burgstahler, Hail and Leuz (2006) also provide evidence on the importance of
enforcement for financial reporting outcomes. Taken together, this evidence suggests
that the degree of enforcement is one of many important factors that will drive variation
in financial reporting outcomes with the widespread adoption of IFRS. Enforcement will
matter in that setting and could well be an important influence on outcomes (but certainly
not the only important influence on outcomes).
At this point, I do not think we have very strong evidence to help us fully
understand the importance of enforcement with respect to financial reporting outcomes as
IFRS is adopted around the world or which elements of enforcement are important in
determining outcomes. That said, even if enforcement were uniformly strict across
countries, we would not anticipate that the financial reporting outcomes would be the
same because the other forces will continue to affect outcomes to some extent.
Ultimately financial reporting outcomes will represent a trade-off between the costs and
benefits of more informative financial reports (absent the effects of enforcement) and the
local enforcement regime.
The most direct evidence on the role of enforcement that I am aware of with
respect to financial reporting quality associated with the adoption of IFRS is from Daske,
Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) who study the capital-market effects around the introduction
of mandatory IFRS reporting in 26 countries. They find that the capital-market benefits
(market liquidity, cost of capital) around the time of IFRS adoption occur only in
countries where firms have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is
strong. They also find that capital-market effects are strongest for member states of the
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European Union where simultaneous efforts were made to improve governance and
enforcement.
While the evidence on enforcement with respect to accounting standards is
provocative, it isn’t as compelling or as robust as we might like. Moreover, it is
interesting to ask whether we have used appropriate measures of enforcement in the
international accounting literature. If our measures of enforcement or the legal
environment are noisy, then we might well find that better measures of enforcement and
the legal environment would yield even stronger impacts of enforcement on the quality of
financial reporting outcomes. In that spirit, perhaps we can learn from the legal literature
on measuring the legal environment and enforcement.
Mahoney (2008) argues that the fundamental challenge to researchers who attempt to
identify the legal determinants of financial outcomes is measuring a country’s legal
environment. Mahoney points to the minor amendments to Rule 23 and the innovation in
the use of the pre-existing Martin Act that led to large changes in the legal environment,
in this case to the extent of private and public enforcement of securities laws. Mahoney
goes on to say that one would not expect the coding of existing rules to capture how the
law is actually used. As I mentioned previously, this has caused researchers to consider
alternative measures for the legal environment, such as the survey of attorneys across
countries carried out by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2005) and
Balas, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2007).
Coffee (2007) argues that the La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006)
measures of enforcement are likely deficient because they measure the rules on the
books, similar to the concerns raised by Mahoney (2008). Coffee argues instead that
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measures of enforcement that rely on inputs and outputs are likely to be superior and that
measures of enforcement should include both public and private measures of
enforcement.
Jackson (2007) appears to have been one of the first to attempt to measure
enforcement using enforcement inputs and outputs across countries. Variables such as
the size of a regulator’s budget and staff relative to some measure of market
capitalization or GDP might be a relevant “input” measure. The number of enforcement
actions brought by the regulator and some assessment of the penalties imposed (monetary
and perhaps jail terms) again relative to some appropriate scalar might be useful “output”
measures. One of the issues of course is trying to figure out how to scale the various
measures of enforcement in a cross-country study when the size of the markets and the
available legal and regulatory enforcement mechanisms differ considerably.
Jackson and Roe (2008) measure public enforcement powers using proxies for the
real resources available to regulators (staffing levels and budgets). Their measures are
significantly associated with standard measures of stock market development (stock
market capitalization, trading volume, the number of domestic firms and the number of
IPOs) across countries. Further, they provide evidence that their measures of public
enforcement are generally as important as measures of private enforcement in explaining
their measures of stock market development. They argue that La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes
and Shleifer (2006) erroneously conclude that public enforcement does not matter
because of their measurement of enforcement as formal rules of enforcement power as
opposed to measures that describe the real resources available to regulators for
enforcement. Jackson and Roe also provide evidence that common law origins do not

14

have a significant relationship with stock market capitalization once they control for
enforcement.3 Coffee (2007) argues that measuring actual enforcement cases and fines
could also be extremely important. Thus, despite the fact that Jackson and Roe only have
input measures in their study, they still find evidence supporting the strong association
between public enforcement and economic development.
Inferring causality is of course an important and difficult task in this case. Does stock
market capitalization affect enforcement budgets or do enforcement budgets affect stock
market capitalization? Jackson and Roe (2008) discuss this issue explicitly but do not
come to any definitive conclusions in my opinion. At this point I do not think we can
rule out the possibility that financial development leads to the creation of larger
enforcement institutions and budgets. Nevertheless, the measures of enforcement are
interesting to consider, especially when thinking about the effects of the adoption of
IFRS. In tests which might examine the role of enforcement on financial reporting
outcomes associated with the adoption of IFRS, the causality issues will not be as severe
since we have the practically simultaneous adoption of IFRS across many countries
where the enforcement regimes are quite different.
Jackson (2007), Coffee (2007) and Jackson and Roe (2008) discuss the wide variation
in enforcement across countries as measured by enforcement inputs and outputs. While
these measures may be superior to other measures of enforcement used in the literature,
we should be careful not to assume that it is the budget per se that matters. It is likely
that in countries where stricter securities regulations are adopted, that the country will
also see to it that an adequate regulator will be put in place to police those regulations
3

This suggests that there may be an important correlated omitted variable in accounting studies which
attribute large differences in the quality of financial reports across countries to whether the country has a
common law or code law origin (e.g., Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000)).
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with a budget that allows that to occur. So while the input and output measures may turn
out to be reliable measures of enforcement, we shouldn’t interpret that as the sole factor
that determines enforcement. In other words, increasing enforcement budgets in
countries with lax securities regulations on the books need not lead to any stronger
enforcement.
Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) find evidence that IFRS adoption affected
companies’ capital-market measures only in countries with incentives to be transparent
and where there was strong legal enforcement. The enforcement effects may even be
stronger than suggested in Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi because they use the rule of law
index from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006), which does not rely on either input
or output measures of enforcement . As such, if we were to measure enforcement inputs
and outputs, we might find a much stronger role for enforcement in explaining variation
in financial reporting outcomes following the adoption of IFRS.
If indeed enforcement is an important factor in determining financial reporting
outcomes, we should anticipate large variation in the consequences of adopting IFRS, due
in part to variation in enforcement activities around the world documented in the above
cited legal literature. But as I have mentioned previously, variation in financial reporting
outcomes will not just be driven by variation in enforcement but by all of the forces that
shape managers’ reporting incentives.
One place for future research would be to try to investigate the effects of changes
in enforcement on reporting outcomes. If enforcement is an important factor in
determining financial reporting outcomes, we should anticipate variation in the financial
reporting outcomes associated with IFRS due to variation in enforcement activities
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around the world. Here we have at best scant, but enticing evidence. Daske, Hail, Leuz
and Verdi (2008) find that the capital-market effects they measure are stronger in
member states of the European Union, which they suggest was due to the EU’s efforts to
improve governance and enforcement which was taking place concurrently with the
adoption of IFRS. While this is interesting, it is of course a crude measure. Looking for
places where enforcement changed and other institutions were held constant might lead
us to a further understanding on the role of enforcement. Leuz and Wysocki (2008) also
indicate that further research on enforcement could yield large payoffs in our
understanding of the effects of disclosure regulations.
5. Concluding Comments
Studies of the impact of accounting standards on financial reporting outcomes
point to a variety of factors that influence those outcomes and suggest that the accounting
standards may not be as important as incentives, enforcement, ownership structure and
other market and legal forces. The reliability of the empirical measures of all of these
factors is of course important in assessing whether a particular factor is important.
Recent work in the legal literature suggests that existing measures of the legal
environment and enforcement may be noisy. The recent legal literature further suggests
that measures of both public enforcement and private enforcement are correlated with
capital market outcomes and that public enforcement is likely to be as important as
private enforcement. As such, it is conceivable that enforcement has an important effect
on how the adoption of IFRS affects financial reporting outcomes. To the extent that
enforcement varies substantially across countries, we are likely to see correspondingly
wide variation in financial reporting outcomes. While enforcement may prove to be an
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important determinant of financial reporting outcomes, it can only mitigate the influence
of other factors that are known to affect financial reporting outcomes. Only the
alignment of the overall portfolio of countries’ institutional and economic forces
affecting financial reporting outcomes will lead to more uniform financial reporting
quality across countries. Further, without the alignment of this portfolio of countries’
institutional and economic forces, uniform financial reporting quality across countries,
even if achievable, is not likely result in substantive economic benefits in all countries.
Ball (2008) discusses the increasingly rules-based approach of U.S. regulators to
accounting standards and Mahoney (2008) discusses the increasing regulatory focus of
U.S. securities laws relative to the past. An interesting question with regard to IFRS
adoption is whether regulators in each country will start to offer interpretations and
guidance on IFRS that will introduce differences in the standards across countries. Since
financial reporting is an endogenous outcome of the political and market forces within
each country, this outcome seems likely. As such, the “standards” themselves will
become less uniform over time (and perhaps more rules-based and regulatory in flavor)
which will lead to further differences in financial reporting over time, unless the
underlying economic and institutional forces across countries become more similar.
I would like to end on one cautionary note related to a point I made in Holthausen
(2003) and also discussed by Leuz and Wysocki (2008). The issue is whether it is feasible
to actually identify the most important determinants of financial disclosure quality at the
country level. While I have discussed the likely importance of enforcement in this paper,
it is not obvious that in cross-country studies we can disentangle the effects of
enforcement from that of all the other institutions, regulations and incentives within a

18

country. Many institutions that are created within a country are complementary, designed
with respect to the underlying economies and with respect to each other. So while
enforcement is undoubtedly important, countries with strong enforcement are likely to
have regulations that are more stringent than countries with weak enforcement. Thus,
international studies that attempt to try to disentangle the effects of complementary
institutions, incentives and ownership structures are not likely to be very convincing.
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